McAllen, Texas Criminal Defense, Divorce and DWI Lawyer Johnathan Ball

August 16, 2010

Hidalgo County Texas Sheriff’s Deputies Find Cocaine

Edinburg: Deputies find 42 pounds of cocaine
Comments 1
August 16, 2010 8:45 PM
NEAR WESLACO | ARMED ROBBERY

Sheriff’s deputies are looking for an illegal immigrant in connection with an aggravated robbery at a convenience store Sunday night.

Hidalgo County sheriff’s deputies responded an alarm to the Kwik-E Mart south of Mile 12 North along Farm-to-Market Road 1015 at about 10:30 p.m. Sunday, according to a department statement.

Upon arrival, the store’s clerk told deputies she had been held at gunpoint by a Hispanic man who fled south in a blue Chevrolet Trailblazer. The man took an undisclosed amount of cash, deputies said.

Deputies checked the SUV’s license plates, which led to a house at 3002 Clifford St., near the intersection of Mile 9 1/2 North and Mile 6 1/2 West.

Patrol and linebacker deputies caught up to the Trailblazer as it approached the house. A woman inside the SUV was detained, but the driver, a man, escaped.

The woman identified the driver as Leonardo Geronimo Zaleta, 28, who was deported in 2007 and 2008 after separate burglary arrests.

A tracking dog was unable to find Zaleta.

An arrest warrant for aggravated robbery has been issued for Zaleta. If arrested and convicted of aggravated robbery, Zaleta could spend up to life in prison and face up to a $10,000 fine.

Anyone who has seen Zaleta is urged to call Hidalgo County Crime Stoppers at (956) 668-8477.

EDINBURG | DRUG BUST

Hidalgo County sheriff’s deputies arrested two men allegedly found with cocaine on Sunday.

Investigators received a tip that a black Chevrolet Tahoe would be transporting the drugs Sunday afternoon in Edinburg, deputies said in a statement

A canine deputy unit pulled over a black Tahoe on traffic violations about 5 p.m. Sunday near Farm-to-Market Roads 1925 and 493.

Deputies attempted to arrest Juan Manuel Morales, who was driving the Tahoe, on undisclosed traffic violations. Gabriel Cedillo was a passenger in the vehicle.

The drug dog sniffed the SUV and 42 pounds of cocaine were found inside.

Both men were formally charged with possession of a controlled substance at an arraignment hearing Monday afternoon at the Hidalgo County Jail. Bond for Morales was set at $30,000. Cedillo received a $25,000 bond.

Because of the weight of the drugs, each man could spend up to life in prison and face up to a $100,000 fine upon conviction.

HIDALGO | FUGITIVES ARRESTED

Customs officers in Hidalgo arrested two fugitives last week who were wanted for allegedly committing an armed robbery.

Officers patrolling the Hidalgo International Bridge Saturday identified a Houston couple traveling into the United States as Luis Cruz, 27, and Crystal Salazar, 23 — two fugitives wanted by the Harris County Sheriff’s Office for charges stemming from an armed robbery.

Cruz and Salazar — both U.S. citizens— were transferred to the Hidalgo Police Department. Both are pending extradition proceedings to Harris County.

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Monitor staff writers Jared Taylor and Ana Ley compiled this report.

See archived ‘News’ stories »

May 11, 2010

Former McAllen Mayor’s DWI Case Filed

Former McAllen mayor’s DWI case filed

Comments 74 | Recommend 44

District judge’s case status unknown

The Monitor

EDINBURG — Prosecutors said they filed the driving while intoxicated case of former McAllen mayor Leo Montalvo on Monday, seven months after his arrest.

Meanwhile, the DWI case of Jesse Contreras, presiding judge of the 449th state District Court in Hidalgo County, has yet to be filed in Cameron County — and prosecutors did not offer an update on its status.

Because the charges against the two officials are misdemeanors, prosecutors have two years after their arrests to decide whether there’s enough evidence to prosecute them.

Montalvo was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated after a collision June 8, 2009, along Ware Road in McAllen. Police said the former mayor smelled of alcohol and slurred his words as he explained to officers that no one involved in the crash was hurt.

“Do you know who I am?” he asked officers, according to the police report. “Please, sir, don’t ruin my several years of public service.”

The case remained unfiled by Hidalgo County District Attorney Rene Guerra until Monday. The Monitor inquired about Montalvo’s case on Friday, when court records showed it had not yet been filed.

Cases such as Montalvo’s hung in limbo while other DWI arrests of lesser-known officials publicized by local media were assigned to courts more quickly.

For instance, McAllen police Officer Alex Alvarez was arrested on a DWI charge on July 5, 2009. His case was filed in Hidalgo County court on July 31, 2009. The case is still pending in Hidalgo County Court-at-law No. 2, after Guerra filed a motion this month to reconsider and reopen evidence that had been suppressed in the case.

In another case, Mission police Officer Martin Flores Villarreal was arrested June 28, 2008, after allegedly driving an unmarked Mission police vehicle while intoxicated. That case was assigned to Hidalgo County Court-at-law No. 2 on July 31, 2008, and is set to go before a jury on March 16.

Guerra, for his part, said he had waited to file Montalvo’s case so he could review it himself — unlike most other cases, which are reviewed by his assistant prosecutors. When asked why the case had not been filed until Monday, he said “it was a mistake” to wait on it.

“We had a miscommunication,” Guerra said of his assistant prosecutors. “We file those cases usually within six months.”

Montalvo became McAllen’s first Hispanic mayor after he defeated longtime leader Othal Brand in 1997. The victory marked a symbolic change in power locally — something Montalvo downplayed at the time.

A woman who answered the telephone at Montalvo’s house Monday said the former mayor would not discuss the drunken driving case with the media.

Contreras’ case has remained under consideration by Cameron County District Attorney Armando Villalobos’ office since September 2008.

Contreras, a Mercedes municipal judge at that time, was arrested on South Padre Island on Sept. 21, 2008. He was elected to the 449th state District Court later that year.

Police responded to a disturbance involving a patron at the Coral Reef Lounge early that Sept. 21 morning but learned the person had already left, according to Monitor archives. Officers obtained a vehicle description at the bar, and Contreras was pulled over about three miles south of the business with a female companion inside his vehicle.

Asked Friday about the status of Contreras’ case, Villalobos’ spokesman, Jason Moody, asked for an information request in writing. That request was submitted to his e-mail address. Moody has not responded to subsequent inquiries regarding the case’s status. Villalobos has until this fall to decide whether his office will prosecute Contreras’ DWI case.

Contreras could not be reached for comment on his cell phone Tuesday afternoon.

A Monitor analysis of Hidalgo County court records after Montalvo’s arrest revealed that since 2004, at least 20 local high-profile people had been charged with driving while intoxicated. Some of the cases are still pending in local county courts years after the initial arrest, while others were dropped without any hearings in court.

Of the resolved cases, 73 percent were dismissed by judges or closed when a district attorney refused to prosecute. The dismissal rate was 23 percent higher than all DWI cases in Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr and Willacy counties in the same period.

Other local public officials have been arrested on suspicion of drunken driving since Montalvo’s arrest — notably, Hidalgo County District Clerk Laura Hinojosa, who was arrested in December.

Guerra, the Hidalgo County district attorney, said his office continues to review evidence in Hinojosa’s case, adding that he has made no decision on when or whether it will be prosecuted.

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Jared Taylor covers law enforcement and general assignments for The Monitor. You can reach him at (956) 683-4439.

Hidalgo County deputy constable arrested for DWI

Hidalgo County deputy constable’s DWI arrest not his first

Comments 76 | Recommend 24

The Monitor

ALAMO — Police arrested a senior deputy constable Saturday after he allegedly lost control of his pickup truck and collided with a car driven by an elderly couple.

 

It was his third DWI arrest in three years.

 

Alamo police arrested Javier Hinojosa on driving while intoxicated and intoxication assault charges Saturday evening after he allegedly lost control of his Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck and collided nearly head-on with the elderly couple’s car.

 

Saturday’s DWI arrest is the second in about four months for Hinojosa — he has an August 2009 DWI case pending in Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 5.

 

Precinct 2 Constable Gilbert “Chato” Alaniz said he suspended Hinojosa for one week without pay after the DWI arrest last year.

 

Hired in June 2005, Hinojosa serves as senior deputy constable for Alaniz, who said he has been unable to talk with Hinojosa. The constable said he would conduct his own investigation into the matter to determine Hinojosa’s job status.

 

“Something is going to be done, believe me,” Alaniz said. “Something is definitely going to be done.”

 

In his latest arrest, Hinojosa, 45, was driving on the 300 block of East Business 83 in Alamo about 6:50 p.m. Saturday when he allegedly lost control of his Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck, veered into the oncoming lanes of traffic and collided with a passenger car driven by an elderly couple, said Alamo Police Chief Arturo Espinoza.

 

“It looks like he went into the oncoming traffic and they collided almost head-on,” the chief said.

Hinojosa’s 12-year-old son was riding in the pickup truck with him at the time. The boy was transported to an area hospital for observation along with the elderly couple, Espinoza said. The couple, both who are in their 70s, remained hospitalized in serious condition Monday.

 

Hinojosa, of Edinburg, refused to provide a field sobriety test, Espinoza said.

 

Oddly, Hinojosa was taken to three different hospitals — Edinburg Regional, McAllen Medical Center and Rio Grande Regional Hospital — and no blood was drawn because he refused to provide submit to a blood test, Espinoza said.

State law requires anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated who is involved in an accident that causes “serious bodily injury” or death to provide a blood specimen.

 

Hidalgo County District Attorney Rene Guerra said he has never encountered a situation where a person arrested on intoxication assault or manslaughter charges did not provide a blood sample — and the hospital complies with a suspect’s request.

 

“No one has ever had an issue,” Guerra said.

 

Police did not try to obtain a search warrant, which would have forced Hinojosa to submit to the blood test because it was the weekend, and whatever alcohol or drugs he may have consumed had left his system, the chief said.

 

“We didn’t go that route as to try and get a warrant on him,” Espinoza said. “We’re going with a refusal” to submit to a blood or breath sample.

 

Hospital officials could not be reached for comment after business hours Monday.

 

Hinojosa was formally charged with intoxication assault and driving while intoxicated with a child passenger during an arraignment Sunday in Alamo Municipal Court. Bond was set at $150,000.

 

“It’s troubling to us when those entrusted with upholding the law don’t,” said Ana Verley, a local victims’ advocate for Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. “It’s sad and disappointing that these things happen and innocent people keep getting hurt.”

 

Records detailing Hinojosa’s career before he was hired by the Hidalgo County Precinct 2 Constable Office were unavailable Monday.

 

An open records request with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education, which maintains peace officers’ career histories, was not immediately returned Monday afternoon.

 

Hinojosa was also arrested in January 2006 on DWI charges that were dismissed by Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 5 later that year, court records state. Alaniz said he did not suspend Hinojosa at that time because he was not convicted.

 

Hinojosa had a DWI arrest dismissed from Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 2 in September 2003. He also had assault charges dropped in Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 1 in March 2002.

 

Hinojosa remained at the Hidalgo County Jail on Monday. Intoxication assault is a third degree felony that has a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine upon conviction. Driving while intoxicated with a child passenger is a state jail felony that has a maximum sentence of two years in jail and up to a $10,000 fine.

 

Hinojosa is not Alaniz’s only deputy to have been arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated.

 

In October 2007, Hidalgo County Precinct 2 chief deputy constable Sergio Hinojosa — Javier’s younger brother — was arrested for allegedly driving while intoxicated in San Juan. That case was dropped in Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 1 in May 2008 due to insufficient evidence. Alaniz said he fired Sergio Hinojosa after his DWI arrest.

 

With the latest DWI arrest, Alaniz would not say whether he intends to dismiss Hinojosa. Regardless, the constable said he plans on another suspension for his senior deputy.

 

“What can I say? We all do mistakes that we regret later on in life,” Alaniz said. “It’s sad, but what can we do about it?

 

“What’s done is done, my friend.”

___

 

Monitor staff writer Jeremy Roebuck contributed to this story.

___


Jared Taylor covers law enforcement and general assignments for The Monitor. You can reach him at (956) 683-4439.

March 19, 2010

Texas Jury Charges and Instructions

JURY CHARGES AND INSTRUCTIONS:
A GENERAL OVERVIEW

Presented By Johnathan Ball

HCBA CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCE 2010:
Lawyers as Warriors

Presented by
The Hidalgo County Bar Association

Sponsored by
Foster Quan, LLP

Friday, March 5, 2010
Embassy Suites Hotel * 1800 South 2nd Street * McAllen

JURY CHARGES AND INSTRUCTIONS

The volume of case law available to research on jury charges is daunting. Putting together a comprehensive paper on jury charge and jury instruction case law would be a six month undertaking. Even then you’d have to leave out some really good case law. Because this body of case law is so extensive the purpose of this paper is to give you a brief overview of the jury charge and relevant case law. My hope is to give you a good starting point to begin any research you need to do prior to submitting your charge to the jury.

First things first: draft your jury charge before the start of trial. Start by reading the indictment. Figure out what has been pled against your client. Look at the offense as defined in the penal code. Then put together the charge. The charge will act as a road map for you. It will tell you where the prosecution has to go to get their proof. And it will hopefully show you where to find your reasonable doubt.
Also, try to anticipate any midtrial limiting instructions you may need to request. Think about any 404b issues that may get presented to the jury and be prepared to requested a limiting instruction on that issue.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14-19

The starting point for any jury charge is Article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) which states that the court’s charge should “distinctly set … forth the law applicable to the case; not expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury”.

No Piece of Evidence Can be Singled Out

Failure to Videotape a DWI suspect
A jury charge cannot comment on any part of the evidence, regardless of that what evidence was. In Drewett v. State, 704 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.,1986) involved a DWI arrest in Harris County. The trial Court instructed the jury as follows:
“You are instructed that under the laws of Texas, a county with a population of 25,000 or more is required to provide electronic devices capable of visually recording a person immediately after his arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Evidence has been introduced in this case that such electronic device was not available in Harris County on January 18, 1984, and that therefore the officer failed to visually record the defendant in this case. This is no evidence that the defendant was intoxicated or was not intoxicated. In your deliberations you shall not consider for any purpose, allude to, comment on or discuss the unavailability of the recording as evidence that the defendant was or was not intoxicated. This evidence has been admitted for the sole purpose of showing, if you so find, the unavailability of a required visual recording at the time of the arrest and the reason therefor.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals held this was an impermissible comment on the evidence because the charge singled out one particular piece of testimony. Be mindful of any instruction that puts a spotlight on anyone witness or piece of evidence.

A recent case from the Court of appeals dealing with comments on evidence is Bartlett v. State 270 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In Bartlett the trial court impermissibly instructed the jury that it could consider the defendant’s failure to take the breath test in its deliberations. This was held to be an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence by the trial Court. The Court of Appeals wrote:

“By singling out that evidence, the trial court violated Articles 36.14, 38.04, and 38.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and committed a jury-charge error…“A judicial instruction that singles out a particular piece of evidence, but does not serve one of the legally authorized purposes set out above, risks impinging upon the ‘independence of the jury in its role as trier of the facts, a role long regarded by Texans as essential to the preservation of their liberties.’ Even a seemingly neutral instruction may constitute an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence because such an instruction singles out that particular piece of evidence for special attention.”

Commenting on Expert Testimony

In Russell v. State, 749 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Crim.App.,1988) the defendant was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The defendant presented a clinical psychologist at trial who testified the Defendant was a pedophiliac and could not conform his conduct with the dictates of society. The court instructed the jury it was not bound by testimony offered by a witness qualified as expert. The court instructed the jury:

“You are instructed that you are not bound by the testimony offered by a witness qualified as an expert. You may give it the weight to which you find it is entitled and may weigh such testimony with all other evidence offered in this case.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals held this was an impermissible singling out of evidence and testimony.
When the Judge Can Single Out Testimony or Evidence in the Charge
Bartlett identified three circumstances when it is appropriate to single out evidence: 1. when the law directs the attachment of a certain amount of weight to evidence, such as accomplice witness testimony, 2. evidence admitted for a limited purpose; when the law has created a statutory presumption; and, 3. when evidence is contingent on the admissibility of certain facts that it is up to the jury to decide. Evidence not in one of these three categories should not be singled out.

Scope of the Charge

Keeping CCP 36.14 in mind, a jury instruction should be crafted by referencing the indictment and the supporting evidence admitted during the trial. Jury instructions should be restricted to the scope of the indictment. Only theories alleged in the pleadings should be given to the jury. See Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). The charge should not enlarge the scope of the pleadings. In other words, the indictment controls the scope of the charge and additional theories should not be included in the charge which were not pled or for which there is no supporting evidence. See Id.
Further, in Dowden v. State 537 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the jury charge included the robbery and aggravated robbery statutes in their entirety. The charge included portions that were neither pled in the indictment, nor proven at trial. The Court held this practice of blindly reciting an entire statute was wrong. In a stinging retribution of the trial court the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote:

“This practice at best is useless and at worst may confuse and mislead the jury and, therefore, prejudice a defendant. This Court in the past has had occasion to caution against the enumeration in the charge of portions of a statute that could not be relied upon for a conviction.”

The Charge Must Apply the Law to This Case

Further, it is not enough to simply recite legal platitudes in the jury charge. The purpose of the charge by a trial court must clearly apply the law to the very facts of the case. It is not simply to recite abstract propositions of law and general principles. See Atunez v. State, 647 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Criminal App.,1983).

Ask and Ye Shall Receive: Charging on A Defensive Theory

There are numerous defensive instructions that can potentially get submitted to the jury. Entrapment, self-defense, mistake, necessity and defense of third persons are a few of the theories available. When in doubt, ask for the instruction. Remember, if evidence is introduced from any source which raises an issue on a defensive theory, the theory must, upon proper request, be included in the court’s charge. Ojeda v. State, 712 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
The accused is entitled to an instruction on the defensive theory even if the issue was raised only by the defendant’s testimony alone. Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). And it does not matter the evidence presented is strong, weak, unimpeached, contradicted, or unbelievable. The defendant is entitled to the instruction. Period. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The reason the defendant is entitled to the instruction once it is raised, is because it is not the court’s function to determine the credibility or weight to be given the evidence raising the defensive issue in a jury trial. Gibson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). It is the province of the jury to determine if the evidence is credible and supports the defensive theory. Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). See also Birch v. State 948 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.-San Antonio,1997).
Request the defensive instruction if the issue is raised from any source, regardless of who strong the testimony or evidence may be.

Fifth Amendment and the Defendant’s Failure to Testify Instruction

We have all heard since we were eight years old about the Fifth Amendment which states “No person shall be []shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
And jury is not permitted to draw adverse inferences from the fact that the Defendant elected not testify at trial on the merits. The defendant shall have the right to have the jury instructed as such. The right to have the jury instructed not to draw adverse inferences from the election to testify carries over to the punishment phase as well. Conversely, if the defendant does elect to at the punishment phase, the jury should be instructed not draw adverse inferences from defendant’s failure to testify at the guilty/innocence stage of trial. See Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Estell v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).

Note: Some jury charges will state something to the effect of : “You are instructed that our law provides that the failure of the defendant to testify shall not be taken as a circumstance against him (emphasis added).” I don’t like when the charges talk about a Defendant’s failure to testify. Failure suggests to me that the Defendant should have done something but did not.
I prefer to see a charge say “Our law provides that a defendant may testify in his own behalf if he elects to do so. This, however, is a privilege accorded a defendant, and in the event he elects not to testify, that fact cannot be taken as a circumstance against him.”

Entitlement to Limiting Instructions During Trian Relating to 404b

Texas Rule of Evidence 105(a) states : When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the Court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly; but, in the absence of the such request the court’s action shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal.” In other words, when evidence or testimony is admitted, the Defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction on the evidence.

In Rankin v. State , 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim. App-1996) the court held:

“Limiting instructions given for the first time during the jury charge thus do not constitute an efficacious application of Rule 105(a) since it allows for the possibility that evidence will be used improperly in clear contravention to the purpose of the rule. Since limiting instructions operate most effectively when given simultaneously with the relevant evidence, it would not do to grant trial courts “discretion” to deliver those instructions, after they had been properly requested, at a less opportune time.”

The point of Rankin is to ask for the limiting instruction immediately. First, it preserves should the Court refuses the instruction. And secondly, it puts the testimony or evidence into context with the jury immediately. “ The purpose of … midtrial limiting instructions is to insure that the jurors realize the proper use of each bit of evidence as it comes in. Where the jurors have been accumulating their impressions of the evidence over the course of the trial, it is impossible for them to go back at the close of the trial and reassess the evidence in light of the limiting instruction, even if they could appreciate which items of evidence the instruction was supposed to apply to. These difficulties are avoided by instructions at the time of introduction of evidence received for a limited purpose. 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, Evidence § 5065. See Rankin at 712.

Objecting to the Jury Charge

CCP 36.14 states “[T]he defendant or his counsel shall have a reasonable time to examine the same and he shall present his objections thereto in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of objection…The requirement that the objections to the court’s charge be in writing will be complied with if the objections are dictated to the court reporter in the presence of the court and the state’s counsel, before the reading of the court’s charge to the jury. Compliance with this article is all that is necessary to preserve, for review, the exceptions and objections present to the charge…”
First, remember to take your time in reading the charge. You are allowed sufficient time read the charge and formulate your objections.
Regarding objections, in Almanza v. State, the court of criminal appeals wrote : “we have concluded that Article 36.19 actually separately contains the standards for both fundamental error and ordinary reversible error. If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the error is “calculated to injure the rights of defendant,” which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. In other words, an error which has been properly preserved by objection will call for reversal as long as the error is not harmless. On the other hand, if no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was “fundamental,” he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he “has not had a fair and impartial trial”-in short “egregious harm.”
In other words: When in doubt, object. It is better to be safe and preserve the error for review under a lower threshold.
Conclusion
The jury charge is fertile ground to present your defensive theories. But just as importantly, it is your opportunity to limit the charges against your client to their proper scope. Request any instructions you believe you client is entitled. Object when you think the charge includes or does not include something that is relevant. Especially any type of comment in the charge that singles out on particular witness. And request limiting instructions when necessary to keep evidence in its relevant context.

October 19, 2009

A Primer on the Myth of Latent Print Identification

LATENT FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION IS UNRELIABLE AND FAILS TO MEET THE MOST BASIC SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES TO ENSURE RELIABILITY

      A latent fingerprint is the reproduction of the friction ridges of the fingers in perspiration or oily matter on an object which has

been touched. See Gary W. Jones, Courtroom Testimony For the Fingerprint Expert. Latent fingerprint examiners make

identifications when they find a certain number of ridge characteristics to be in common, both in terms of type and location.

However, there is no consensus in the latent print expert community as to how many common characteristics should be found

before an identification is proclaimed. See An Analysis of Standards in Fingerprint Identification, FBI L. Enforcement Bull, June

1972.

A.        Fingerprints are not as unique as once thought.

      The long held belief that no to prints are alike has come under intense scrutiny in recent years. During expert testimony in a recent federal case, the government call Steven Karasky, a board certified member of the International Association for Identification (IAI) and a United States Postal Inspector. Mr. Karasky acknowledged during his testimony that no published studies regarding false identification had ever been conducted. He also testified he personally knew of instances where prints from two different people contained as many as ten matching ridge characteristics. See U.S. v. Parks (C.D. Cal. 1999). Following an evidentiary hearing the Court held that fingerprint evidence was not scientific and lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. In fact the Court was incredulous telling one of the experts: “You don’t have any standards, As far as I can tell, you have no standards, its just an ipse dixit.” The testimony was excluded. . See U.S. v. Parks (C.D. Cal. 1999) .  See also The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client Mears, Michael and Day, Therese M 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705. 

      In addition to United States experts recognizing the lack of total uniqueness in latent prints, experts in other countries have discovered the same and published their research. Israeli fingerprint examiners found fingerprints from two different people that contained seven matching ridge characteristics. As the authors of that study acknowledged, an expert with many years of experience behind him could make a false identification when comparing two such prints. Unfortunately, no scientific study has been performed that reasonably indicates the probabilities of fingerprints from different people having varying numbers of matching ridge characteristics. See Y. Mark & D. Attias, What Is the Minimum Standard of Characteristics for Fingerprint Identification? 22 Fingerprint Whorld 148, 148. So we are left to ask ourselves, “What is the scientific basis for analysts’ long held position that no to prints are the same?”

B.        Fingerprint identification is not used outside of the courtroom setting.

            Fingerprint analysis is not used outside of the judicial setting. It is exclusively the providence of the courts. See The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client Mears, Michael and Day, Therese M 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705. This ;ack of out-of-court use is one of the Daubert factors adopted by the Texas courts which trial courts should look to in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony.  

C.        There is no uniformity regarding the number of ridge markers required to designate a print as a match.

            Latent fingerprint examiners in the United States are currently operating in the absence of any uniform objective standards. The absence of standards is most glaring with respect to the ultimate question that should be asked of all fingerprint comparisons: what constitutes a sufficient basis to make a positive identification? See Simon Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12 Sci. in Context 139, 147 (1999). See also The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client Mears, Michael and Day, Therese M 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705. As there are no objective industry standards, individual analysts are left to their own, subjective standards in making the determination.

            Though the United States has no uniform identification standard, many other countries have set such standards based on a minimum number of points of comparison. Italy retains the minimum standard of seventeen matching points before a comparison can be made, and both France and Australia require twelve points. Thirty is the minimum number required for a matchin Argentina and Brazil. See David R. Ashbaugh, Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology 125 (CRC Press 1999) . See also The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client Mears, Michael and Day, Therese M 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705.

            The International Association for Identification (IAI) is a private organization/governing body for forensic science. The IAI makes recommendations to the National Academy of Science which in turn makes recommendations to Congress itself. As far back as 1973 the IAI issued a report that indicated the lack of testing in the fingerprint identification field. The IAI formed a standardization committee for the purpose of determining the minimum number of friction ridge characteristics which must be present in two impression in order to establish a positive identification. After three years of examining the issue the IAI was unable to reach a consensus on the minimum number needed. See The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client Mears, Michael and Day, Therese M 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705.

            Underlying the real reason for not providing a minimum number was “[T]he absence of valid scientific criteria for establishing the minimum number of minutiae has been the main reason that professionals have avoided accepting one.” See David Stoney, The Scientific Basis of Expert Testimony on Fingerprint Identification, Modern Scientific Evidence: the Law and Science of Expert Testimony Section 21-3. The official position of the IAI since 1973 is that no minimum number of corresponding points of identification is required for an identification. Instead, the IAI leaves the determination of a sufficient basis for an identification entirely to the subjective judgment of the particular examiner.

            In other words, there is no general acceptance in the scientific community on latent fingerprint analysis requirements. It is purely subjective to the individual examiner.

D.        In the United States the results of the fingerprint identification are purely the opinion of the analyst.

            David Ashbaugh, a leading forensic scientist stated, that [i]n some instances we may form an opinion on eight ridge characteristics,but in other cases, we may require twelve or more to form the same opinion. Ashbaughs explanation for this sliding scale is that some ridge characteristics are more unique than others. However, fingerprint examiners have never adopted any weighted measures of the different characteristics. Therefore, as Ashbaugh has recognized, the particular examiners determination of whether eight or twelve matching characteristics are sufficient in a particular case is entirely subjective. Without objective professional standards, courts are without sufficient basis to judge the validity, admissibility, and worthiness of fingerprint identification testimony. David Ashbaugh, The Key to Fingerprint Identification, 10 Fingerprint Whorld 93 (Apr. 1985). The results are identifications made by examiners using their own ad hoc criteria. Any way you look at it, the positive identification of the Defendant is based solely on the opinion of one person, without any guiding standards.

E.        There is no known error rate in fingerprint analysis

            There have been no controlled studies to determine the error rate in the field of latent print identification. Without known error rates the State will be unable to meet its burden and the admission of the fingerprint analysis will not meet the Daubert test.

            At the very heart of verifiable certainty is a known error rate against which comparisons can be made. In addition to failing to provide a known error rate, the testimony of fingerprint experts also lacks scientific studies upon which predictions of probabilities can be made. Lacking any such probability studies, latent print technicians do not offer opinions of identification in terms of probability. Indeed, the rules of their primary professional association, the IAI, actually prohibit latent print examiners from doing so. Instead of testifying regarding probabilities, latent print examiners make the claim of absolute certaintyfor their identifications. Examiners provide an opinion to the fact finder that the latent print at issue was made by a particular finger to the exclusion of all others in the world! Not even DNA experts make such bold statements. Such assertions of absolute certainty are inherently unscientific. See The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client Mears, Michael and Day, Therese M 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 705. See also Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint Scienceis Revealed, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, (March 2002).

F.        A complete lack of studies exists regarding the reliability of latent fingerprint examinations or any type of peer review.

            In addition to the lack of basic reliability studies, no testing has been conducted to determine the probability of two different people having a number of fingerprint ridge characteristics in common. And to the contrary, the studies and testimony of experts have shown people can have numerous ridge characteristics in common. See paragraph A above.

             This is in sharp contrast to the relatively new field of DNA analysis, where scientific testing has been done to calculate the probability of a

coincidental match. See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint Scienceis Revealed, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev.

605, (March 2002). David Stoney, a leading forensic science scholar, and a trained fingerprint analyst, has written:

            [T]here is no justification [for fingerprint identifications] based on conventional science: no theoretical model, statistics or an empirical validation process. Efforts to assess the individuality of DNA blood typing make an excellent contrast. There has been intense debate over which statistical models are to be applied, and how one should quantify increasingly rare events. To many, the absence of adequate statistical modeling, or the controversy regarding calculations, brings the admissibility of the evidence into question. Woe to fingerprint practice were such criteria applied! Much of the discussion of fingerprint practices in this and preceding sections may lead the critical reader to the question Is there any scientific basis for an absolute identification? It is important to realize that an absolute identification is an opinion, rather than a conclusion based on scientific research. The functionally equivalent scientific conclusion (as seen in some DNA evidence) would be based on calculations showing that the probability of two different patterns being indistinguishably alike is so small that it asymptotes with zero . . . . The scientific conclusion, however, must be based on tested probability models. These simply do not exist for fingerprint pattern comparisons”. See David Stoney, Measurements of Fingerprint Individuality, Advances in Fingerprint Technology at 331.

            The United States Department of Justice concurred in Mr. Stoney’s assessment when it began soliciting validation studies regarding fingerprint identification 2000. As the Department of Justice stated in its solicitation, “the theoretical basis for [fingerprint] individuality has had limited study and needs additional work to demonstrate the statistical basis for identifications.” See Solicitation, Nat’l Inst. Of Justice Forensic Friction Ridge (Fingerprint) Examination Validation Studies (March 2000). See also Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint Scienceis Revealed, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, (March 2002).

G.       Positive identification of fingerprints have led wrongful convictions

            Dr. Simon Cole, an assistant professor of criminology at the University of California-Irvine authored an article entitled More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification which was published in the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology with Northwestern University School of Law. Dr. Cole’s article details eighteen of the most famous instances of false positive identifications of fingerprints. In each of these cases, people were arrested and most spent considerable time in jail. This includes a recent case in 2004 when the FBI arrested an attorney in Oregon as a material witness in the Spain train bombings of that same year. After the FBI finger analysis stated that it was a 100% match, the lawyer, Mr. Mayfield was arrested and held for two weeks. It was ultimately learned that this 100% positive match was completely wrong. Mr. Mayfield was released with an official apology from the FBI.

October 11, 2009

The Horizantal Gaze Nystagmus Test in Texas

OVERVIEW OF THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND THIS PAPER

      A couple of decades ago, The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) developed the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFST). These tests were designed to detect the impaired driver. After development, NHTSA claimed the tests were the most effective means of detecting impaired drivers at the roadside when they are stopped. The SFTS’s are designed as divided attention tests. Divided attention tests require the driver to concentrate on more than on task, and accomplish these tasks successfully, in order to prove their sobriety to the officer. It is claimed the divided attention tests mimic the necessary ability to divide your attention while driving. Since a driver is required to control steering, brake a the right times and accelerate appropriately, the divided attention tests are said to test a person’s ability to effectively multitask. The inability to conduct the divided attention tests exactly as instructed is claimed to be proof positive of a person impairment while driving. The thought process behind this notion is that alcohol significantly reduces the ability to divide attention effectively between multiple tasks. People who have consumed alcohol are unable to satisfactorily divide their attention to handle multiple tasks at once. SFST’s are marketed as simulating the divided attention requirements of driving. The two divided attention tests which became part of the SFST’s battery the Walk-and-Turn and the One-Leg Stand.

     This paper will deal primarily with nystagmus, its causes and how to deal with it at suppression and at trial. The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test (Test) is considered to be the most scientific of all the field sobriety tests. Many consider it to be the most accurate. However, failing to administer the HGN correctly, lack of training and simply rushing through the testing case lead to unnecessary arrest and prosecution for DWI. By understanding the HGN, the science and the administration of the test, it becomes much easier to deal with the test and trial and to neutralize it.

     That being said, buy the NTHSA Field Sobriety Training Manual and memorize it. Invest the money, its worth it. The manual provides instructions and analysis for conducting the field sobriety tests. It also details how to interpret the result of the field sobriety tests. Knowing this manual and having it handy during suppression and trial is your best weapon.

WHAT IS NYSTAGMUS

        Alcohol ingested for intoxication purposes is known as ethyl alcohol or ethanol. Ethanol is found in beer, wine and liquors. Ethanol causes the impairing effects on driving. Drivers who have been drinking have slowed reaction. These slowed reaction times are thought to contribute to the inability to avoid becoming involved in an accident.

     Nystagmus naturally occurs without the presence of alcohol. Nystagmus can be caused by problems Physiological problems influenza, streptococcus infections, vertigo, measles, syphilis, arteriosclerosis, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, Korsakoff’s Syndrome, brain hemorrhage, epilepsy all have been shown to produce nystagmus. Moreover, conditions such as hypertension, motion sickness, sunstroke, eyestrain, eye muscle fatigue, glaucoma, and changes in atmospheric pressure can create gaze nystagmus. The consuming purely legal over-the-counter substances such as caffeine, nicotine, or aspirin also lead to nystagmus almost identical to that caused by alcohol consumption. Despite this whole litany of other-than-alcohol causes for nystagmus, the NHTSA manual summarily dismisses these causes as being . While NHTSA my flippantly these other sources of nystagmus, at least one Federal Court did not.

     In a lengthy opinion, a Federal Court in United States vs. Horn discussed at length the different reasons that nystagmus may be present. The Court went so far as to suggest that it is so well know that nystagmus arises from causes other than alcohol, a Defendant may wish to ask the Court to take judicial notice of this fact. The Horn Court went on to list the following causes of nystagmus other than alcohol:

 

Problems with the inner ear labyrinth; irrigating the ears with warm or cold water; influenza; streptococcus infection; vertigo; measles; syphilis; arteriosclerosis; Korchaff’s syndrome; brain hemorrhage; epilepsy; hypertension; motion sickness; sunstroke; eye strain; eye muscle fatigue; glaucoma; changes in atmospheric pressure; consumption of excessive amounts of caffeine; excessive exposure to nicotine; aspirin; circadian rhythms; acute head trauma; chronic head trauma; some prescription drugs; tranquilizers, pain medication, and anti-convulsant medicine; barbiturates; disorders of the vestibular apparatus and brain stem; cerebellum dysfunction; heredity; diet; toxins; exposure to solvents; extreme chilling; eye muscle imbalance; lesions; continuous movement of the visual field past the eyes; and antihistamine use.

      Now that the definition of nystagmus is known, the different types of nystagmus need to be looked examined briefly. Chapter 8 of NHTSAs DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Manual contains a section entitled Overview of Nystagmus It lists the following types of nystagmus:

1. Vestibular Nystagmus is caused by movement or action to the vestibular system.

     There are four types of vestibular nystagmus:

     Rotational Nystagmus occurs when the person is spun around or rotated rapidly, causing the inner fluid in the ear to be disturbed. If it were  possible    to observe the eyes of a rotating person, they would be seen to jerk noticeably.

     Post Rotational Nystagmus is closely related to rotational nystagmus: when the person stops spinning, the fluid in the inner ear remains disturbed for a period of time, and the eyes continue to jerk.

     Caloric Nystagmus occurs when fluid motion in the canals of the vestibular system is stimulated by temperature as by putting warm water in one ear and cold in the other.

     Positional Alcohol Nystagmus (PAN) occurs when a foreign fluid, such as alcohol, that alters the specific gravity of the blood is in unequal concentrations in the blood and the vestibular system.

2. Nystagmus can also result directly from neural activity

3. Nystagmus may also be caused by certain pathological disorders.

     The idea behind the HGN is that alcohol slows/decreases the eye’s ability to track a stimulus (such as pen being moved across your field of vision). Alcohol will cause the eyes to jerk as they follow or track the stimulus. Without the introduction of alcohol in the body, it is though the person would be able to “normally track” the stimulus being moved across their field of vision. There is a direct correlation being a person’s blood alcohol concentration the intensity of the jerking of the eyes as they move to the side. The HGN test is supposed to identify intoxication by measuring the alcohol induced jerking of the eyes.

     The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration developed the procedures that officers use to administer the HGN test. These procedures are provided to the officer in the DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student Manual.

CONDUCTING THE HGN TEST

     The HGN test begins with the officer checking the eyes to ensure equal tracking and equal pupil size. Lack of equal tracking and equal pupil size can be indicative of head injuries or medical conditions unrelated to alcohol. NHTSA standardized the signs or clues which officers are to look for when determining if someone is intoxicated. These clues include lack of smooth pursuit, distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation and onset of nystagmus prior to reaching a 45 degree angle. To administer the HGN the officer holds a stimulus (usually a pen or finger) 12-15 inches in front of, and slightly above, the suspect’s nose. The officer keeps the tip of the stimulus slightly above the suspect’s eyes. The stimulus is to be moved smoothly in front of the eyes. The officer is looking for all three clues in both eyes. The procedure is to always start with suspect’s left eye. The three clues are looked for one at a time in the in the following sequence: (1)lack of smooth pursuit. It should take approximately 2 seconds to move the stimulus from in front of the subjects face to 45 degrees and the stimulus should be held at 45 degrees for two seconds; (2) distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation. Is should take approximately two seconds to move the pen to maximum deviation, where the pen should be held for a minimum of four seconds to discover the HGN (3) onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees. Again, the stimulus needs to be moved at a two second rate to maximum deviation and then held for a minimum of four seconds. The test sequence then needs to be repeated according to the NTHSA manual. Failure to administer this test correctly will result in the test being held unreliable.

     This means that the officer should be passing the stimulus past each eye six times. Additionally, after the pen is moved across the eye it should be held still to check for nystagmus for a combined total of forty seconds, twenty seconds on each eye. Most officers will move the pen much too fast and will hold the eye at maximum deviation for much less time that is required by NHTSA. Be sure to check the video carefully and see if the officer conducted this test appropriately. If not, ask for a suppression hearing or a Texas Rule of Evidence 705 hearing and see if you can get the results of the test excluded and/or the officer excluded from testifying about the results. This will be discussed in greater detail later.

     Remember that officers who are certified to administer field sobriety tests in Texas have gone through a one day training course. They were taught by other police officers how to conduct and interpret the tests. They were not taught by medical personnel how to identify the various types of nystagmus or how to differentiate between acute alcohol nystagmus and nystagmus brought on by other means.

     NHTSA does not recognize the onset angle can be used to gauge/determine a person’s BAC. NHTSA has determined the standardized criteria for evaluating the HGN. A person can exhibit no more than six clues of horizontal gaze nystagmus. The officer is looking for a total of three clues in each eye. Four or more clues is said to be evidence of intoxication.

RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION

     A weapon is a Rule 705 hearing. I usually ask that the hearing be held pre-trial. Often times I will ask that the suppression hearing and the 705 hearing be held together in a bit of a hybrid type of hearing. This allows me to question the officer not only about the basis of the stop, but also about his/her qualifications.

(a) Disclosure of Facts or Data. The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the expert’s reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event disclose on direct examination, or be required to disclose on cross-examination, the underlying facts or data.

(b) Voir dire. Prior to the expert giving the expert’s opinion or disclosing the underlying facts or data, a party against whom the opinion is offered upon request in a criminal case shall, or in a civil case may, be permitted to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. This examination shall be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. 

(c) Admissibility of opinion. If the court determines that the underlying facts or data do not provide a sufficient basis for the expert’s opinion under Rule 702 or 703, the opinion is inadmissible. 

(d) Balancing test; limiting instructions. When the underlying facts or data would be inadmissible in evidence, the court shall exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger that they will be used for a purpose other than as explanation or support for the expert’s opinion outweighs their value as explanation or support or are unfairly prejudicial. If otherwise inadmissible facts or data are disclosed before the jury, a limiting instruction by the court shall be given upon request

     The seminal case in Texas regarding the admissibility of the HGN is Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Read this case and know it. “For testimony concerning a defendant’s performance on the HGN test to be admissible, it must be shown that the witness testifying is qualified as an expert on the HGN test, specifically concerning its administration and technique. In the case of a police officer or other law enforcement official, this requirement will be satisfied by proof that the officer has received practitioner certification by the State of Texas to administer the HGN. A witness qualified as an expert on the administration and technique of the HGN test may testify concerning a defendant’s performance on the HGN test, but may not correlate the defendant’s performance on the HGN test to a precise BAC.”

     Two other helpful cases for HGN are: (1) State v. Rudd, 255 S.W. 3d 293, 301, 302 (Tex. App.–Waco 2008, pet. ref’d) where it was held it was within the trial court’s discretion to exclude HGN tests where the officer’s credibility was questioned because the tests were not performed on video; and (2) McRae v. State, 152 S.W. 3d 739, 743-44 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted HGN results after it was established by undisputed testimony that the officer did not administer the tests correctly.

     When doing a 705 hearing, show the Judge how the officer administered the tests wrong. Point the inconsistencies between the results of the tests and other “normal” activities. If you client was not swerving or weaving, had no problems responding to the overhead lights, not problems parking the vehicle and exiting the vehicle, etc., why would he have problems on the sobriety tests? Bias of the officer? Rush to judgment? These are all things to look for and point out to the Judge when trying to have the officer stricken from testifying.

September 27, 2009

H.G.N. (Horizantal Gaze Nystagmus) Texas

Pharr woman dies in head-on collision

Filed under: Uncategorized — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , — Johnathan Ball @ 9:32 am
The Monitor

ALTO BONITO — A Pharr woman died in a head-on collision here on Expressway 83 early Saturday morning.

Julia Reyes, 53, and her husband were traveling east about 6:18 a.m. when a Chevrolet pickup traveling on the wrong side of the road collided with them, said Johnny Hernandez, a spokesman for the Texas Department of Public Safety. Reyes’ husband was taken to McAllen Medical Center and treated for multiple injuries. He was listed in stable condition late Saturday.

The driver of the Chevrolet pickup was taken to Rio Grande Regional Hospital in McAllen and treated for abdominal pains. The vehicle’s three passengers sustained only minor cuts.

Police are waiting for the results of a blood test to determine if the truck’s driver, Reynosa resident Miguel Aleman, was intoxicated.

____

 

Nick Pipitone covers McAllen and general assignments for The Monitor. He can be reached at (956) 683-4446.

September 26, 2009

Divorce & Separation In Texas

Texas Legal Separation:

There is no legal separation in Texas.  After filing for a divorce, the judge may be ask the for orders dealing with the use of property and temporary child custody and support.  Texas is a community property state.  Seperate and living apart does not make property you acquire after ceasing to live together as separate property.  

 

Venue/The County to File for Divorce:

One of the parties to the marriage must have residented in for six months and been a resident of the county where the petition is filed for 90 days before the petition is filed.  Your paperwork will be filed with the district clerk or county clerk of county in where you or the other party resides.

Grounds for Divorce:  Fault v. No Fault:

Texas divorces can be both fault or no fault.  The basis for wanting the divorce are detailed in a document called a Petition for Divorce.  This Petition is filed with the District or County Court.  Once the Final Divorce is granted you are no longer married. Divorce in Texas  can be based on:  A) cruelty; B) adultery; C) conviction of a felony; D) abandonment (for at least 1 year); 5E living apart (without cohabitation for 3 years); and/or E) confinement in a mental hospital (for at least 3 years).  The divorce are also be based on discord and conflict of personalities that destroys the legitmate ends of marriage.  This is the no fault divorce.

Mediation in Texas For Divorce Cases:

Many couples getting divorced in Texas choose to workout the specific terms of their divorce degree themselves.   In Texas the courts refer cases to mediation.  The mediation agreemen is usually legally binding.

Texas Annulment:

Annulment occurs when a court declares a marriage to be legally invalid.  Rather than ending a marriage going through the divorce process.   An annulment is a declaration that the marriage was never valid. Annulments can be granted if one party was underage, if the person asking for the annulment was under the influence of alcohol or narcotics, if one party concealed a divorce (within the last 30 days), if the marriage took place less than 72 hours after the license was issued, or due to permanent impotency; fraud, duress, or force; mental incapacity, consanguinity (too closely related); or bigamy. To seek an annulment a petition for annulment must be filed in the County where one of the parties resides.  See the section above regarding venue.

Classes for divorcing parents help end animosity

The Associated Press

Mark Sims and Nicole Collier watched their son become nervous during eight years of custody battles. Isaac, now 10, seemed fearful and took to biting his nails.

Then the two separated parents took a six-week class geared toward separated or divorced parents, and everything changed. In the court-ordered class, they learned how to put their anger aside and focus on what was best for their child.

Both have seen the difference in their son.

“Since we have resolved our issues, he has really relaxed and is much better for it,” said Collier, 37, a stay-at-home mother in Los Angeles with four other children.

The class, aimed at teaching parents to continue parenting together after their marriage or relationship has ended, is part of a changing approach to helping families through a divorce or separation. Such parenting programs are now required in 27 states. In other states, judges can order parents to attend, or there are districtwide or citywide mandates regarding such programs, according to a 2008 survey of mandatory parent education.

“Divorce is so common today, people forget it’s still emotionally complicated or emotionally devastating,” said Robert Emery, director of the Center for Children, Families and the Law at the University of Virginia. To counteract this, Emery said divorce-related parenting classes take a “child-focused, parent-friendly approach” to helping parents work out a parenting plan.

The classes reflect how dramatically family law and policy has changed in the past decades. Gone are the days when divorce proceedings focused on the division of the couple’s financial assets.

“Children’s issues were not as prevalent in the 1960s and the early 1970s,” said Peter Salem, who is executive director of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts in Madison, Wis. “There was a pretty straightforward way of doing things. Mom got the kids, dad visited every other weekend, and that was that.”

Now, there’s a strong focus on the emotional health of both parents and children.

“One of the biggest things that happened to us in the class, and it’s the simplest thing, is to have courtesy when you talk to the other person – to say stuff like ‘thank you,’” said Sims, a 48-year-old Los Angeles musician. “It seems like a really simple thing, but it changes your attitude about what you’re doing.”

The parenting classes vary greatly. There are lecture programs, small groups, and a growing number of Internet-based classes that can be used to fulfill court orders for parent education.

The goal of most is to help parents understand the emotions that go along with divorce, and separate their parental relationship – which will continue – from the adult relationship that is ending, said Salem.

There are other common themes. Among them: Children shouldn’t take on adult roles when the adults are struggling.

“They shouldn’t be necessarily setting up the cable service, the phone service in the new apartment. That’s not their job,” said Salem. “There are certain household responsibilities, but children still need to be children.”

Another: The child needs both parents in his or her life if possible.

Joan Haynes, a naturopathic physician who took a court-ordered class when she divorced last year, went in thinking it would be a waste of time. But she was surprised by what she heard there.

“They said divorce, per se, didn’t hurt children,” said Haynes, of Boise, Idaho, who now shares custody of her 10-year-old daughter with her ex-husband. “What hurts children is the ugliness around the divorce, or even if the parents are still married, it’s the fighting and putting the child in between.”

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Vital Statistics Report, the divorce rate reached a high in 1970 and is slowly declining. Some demographers estimate divorce hit a high of 50 percent in 1970, and is now around 43 percent. However, in the same period the number of people having children together without marriage has risen, and their custody battles can end up in court as well.

Research has shown that some parenting programs can prevent future problems, such as more litigation, said Susan L. Pollet, who with Melissa Lombreglia published a paper on parent education programs in the journal Family Court Review. In a survey, the two found that 46 states have parent education programs related to divorce, some mandated, some not.

“All my clients who have gone, they always come back and say, ‘I’m so happy I went to that; I learned a lot,’” said Lynnette Berg Robe, who practices matrimonial law in Studio City, Calif.

Mandatory classes get a bad rap, Robe said, but they get people in the door and listening to the material.

“It’s not that anybody is trying to get them not to get divorced,” she said. “It’s just that if you behave in a certain way, you’ll end up with an unhappy child who will grow up to be an unhappy adult.”

After eight years of battling, Sims noted that he and Collier aren’t friends – just parents. They prefer to communicate through texting. They go to school conferences together, and recently met up for Isaac’s dentist appointment.

“It’s not like this great thing,” he said. “I would rather not talk to her, to be honest. I’m sure she’d rather not talk to me, but we have to do it for our son’s sake. And this class helped us to be cordial to each other.”

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