McAllen, Texas Criminal Defense, Divorce and DWI Lawyer Johnathan Ball

May 11, 2010

Hidalgo County deputy constable arrested for DWI

Hidalgo County deputy constable’s DWI arrest not his first

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The Monitor

ALAMO — Police arrested a senior deputy constable Saturday after he allegedly lost control of his pickup truck and collided with a car driven by an elderly couple.

 

It was his third DWI arrest in three years.

 

Alamo police arrested Javier Hinojosa on driving while intoxicated and intoxication assault charges Saturday evening after he allegedly lost control of his Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck and collided nearly head-on with the elderly couple’s car.

 

Saturday’s DWI arrest is the second in about four months for Hinojosa — he has an August 2009 DWI case pending in Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 5.

 

Precinct 2 Constable Gilbert “Chato” Alaniz said he suspended Hinojosa for one week without pay after the DWI arrest last year.

 

Hired in June 2005, Hinojosa serves as senior deputy constable for Alaniz, who said he has been unable to talk with Hinojosa. The constable said he would conduct his own investigation into the matter to determine Hinojosa’s job status.

 

“Something is going to be done, believe me,” Alaniz said. “Something is definitely going to be done.”

 

In his latest arrest, Hinojosa, 45, was driving on the 300 block of East Business 83 in Alamo about 6:50 p.m. Saturday when he allegedly lost control of his Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck, veered into the oncoming lanes of traffic and collided with a passenger car driven by an elderly couple, said Alamo Police Chief Arturo Espinoza.

 

“It looks like he went into the oncoming traffic and they collided almost head-on,” the chief said.

Hinojosa’s 12-year-old son was riding in the pickup truck with him at the time. The boy was transported to an area hospital for observation along with the elderly couple, Espinoza said. The couple, both who are in their 70s, remained hospitalized in serious condition Monday.

 

Hinojosa, of Edinburg, refused to provide a field sobriety test, Espinoza said.

 

Oddly, Hinojosa was taken to three different hospitals — Edinburg Regional, McAllen Medical Center and Rio Grande Regional Hospital — and no blood was drawn because he refused to provide submit to a blood test, Espinoza said.

State law requires anyone arrested for driving while intoxicated who is involved in an accident that causes “serious bodily injury” or death to provide a blood specimen.

 

Hidalgo County District Attorney Rene Guerra said he has never encountered a situation where a person arrested on intoxication assault or manslaughter charges did not provide a blood sample — and the hospital complies with a suspect’s request.

 

“No one has ever had an issue,” Guerra said.

 

Police did not try to obtain a search warrant, which would have forced Hinojosa to submit to the blood test because it was the weekend, and whatever alcohol or drugs he may have consumed had left his system, the chief said.

 

“We didn’t go that route as to try and get a warrant on him,” Espinoza said. “We’re going with a refusal” to submit to a blood or breath sample.

 

Hospital officials could not be reached for comment after business hours Monday.

 

Hinojosa was formally charged with intoxication assault and driving while intoxicated with a child passenger during an arraignment Sunday in Alamo Municipal Court. Bond was set at $150,000.

 

“It’s troubling to us when those entrusted with upholding the law don’t,” said Ana Verley, a local victims’ advocate for Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. “It’s sad and disappointing that these things happen and innocent people keep getting hurt.”

 

Records detailing Hinojosa’s career before he was hired by the Hidalgo County Precinct 2 Constable Office were unavailable Monday.

 

An open records request with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education, which maintains peace officers’ career histories, was not immediately returned Monday afternoon.

 

Hinojosa was also arrested in January 2006 on DWI charges that were dismissed by Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 5 later that year, court records state. Alaniz said he did not suspend Hinojosa at that time because he was not convicted.

 

Hinojosa had a DWI arrest dismissed from Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 2 in September 2003. He also had assault charges dropped in Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 1 in March 2002.

 

Hinojosa remained at the Hidalgo County Jail on Monday. Intoxication assault is a third degree felony that has a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine upon conviction. Driving while intoxicated with a child passenger is a state jail felony that has a maximum sentence of two years in jail and up to a $10,000 fine.

 

Hinojosa is not Alaniz’s only deputy to have been arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated.

 

In October 2007, Hidalgo County Precinct 2 chief deputy constable Sergio Hinojosa — Javier’s younger brother — was arrested for allegedly driving while intoxicated in San Juan. That case was dropped in Hidalgo County Court-at-Law No. 1 in May 2008 due to insufficient evidence. Alaniz said he fired Sergio Hinojosa after his DWI arrest.

 

With the latest DWI arrest, Alaniz would not say whether he intends to dismiss Hinojosa. Regardless, the constable said he plans on another suspension for his senior deputy.

 

“What can I say? We all do mistakes that we regret later on in life,” Alaniz said. “It’s sad, but what can we do about it?

 

“What’s done is done, my friend.”

___

 

Monitor staff writer Jeremy Roebuck contributed to this story.

___


Jared Taylor covers law enforcement and general assignments for The Monitor. You can reach him at (956) 683-4439.

Brownsville Mayor Arrested for DWI

Valley Morning Star

SAN BENITO — A baby who was found unresponsive in a San Benito home last week died over the weekend after spending several days on life support, police said.

The infant’s teenage aunt, who was arrested last week on charges of injury to a child, could face further charges in light of the child’s death, police said.

Police arrested Ada Marlene Rodriguez, 17, after her 4-month-old niece was rushed to Valley Baptist Medical Center in Harlingen last week when the infant’s mother found the child lying facedown in a baby carrier inside the home, unresponsive and not breathing. The child’s mother had told officers that she left her baby, Kimberly Nicolas, with Rodriguez earlier that morning.

San Benito police Lt. Martin Morales called the incident “suspicious” and questioned why the infant would have been turned face-down in the baby carrier.

After several days in intensive care, Kimberly died Sunday afternoon, Morales said. In light of the baby’s death, detectives are continuing to investigate and are working to determine whether charges against Rodriguez should be upgraded.

The preliminary investigation indicates the aunt was responsible for the infant’s death, Morales said.

“There are some facts that are coming out that are swaying things toward the 17-year-old being responsible,” he said Tuesday.

“They had an autopsy yesterday, so we’re still following up on it and we’re going to have to wait until we gather more facts,” Morales said. “Right now we’re just tightening up the case.”

Given the outcome of the investigation so far, detectives will likely send their findings to the Cameron County District Attorney’s Office with a request that additional charges be filed, Morales said.

“It would be a DA case, so we would have to submit our case with our findings to the DA’s office and request to have them look at it and see if there should be upgraded charges,” he said.

Cameron County Jail records show Rodriguez is being held there, with her bail set at $100,000, and that she has been identified as an undocumented immigrant.

____

 

Michael Barajas is a reporter for the Valley Morning Star in Harlingen.

Teen Murder Suspect May Face More Charges

Valley Morning Star

SAN BENITO — A baby who was found unresponsive in a San Benito home last week died over the weekend after spending several days on life support, police said.

The infant’s teenage aunt, who was arrested last week on charges of injury to a child, could face further charges in light of the child’s death, police said.

Police arrested Ada Marlene Rodriguez, 17, after her 4-month-old niece was rushed to Valley Baptist Medical Center in Harlingen last week when the infant’s mother found the child lying facedown in a baby carrier inside the home, unresponsive and not breathing. The child’s mother had told officers that she left her baby, Kimberly Nicolas, with Rodriguez earlier that morning.

San Benito police Lt. Martin Morales called the incident “suspicious” and questioned why the infant would have been turned face-down in the baby carrier.

After several days in intensive care, Kimberly died Sunday afternoon, Morales said. In light of the baby’s death, detectives are continuing to investigate and are working to determine whether charges against Rodriguez should be upgraded.

The preliminary investigation indicates the aunt was responsible for the infant’s death, Morales said.

“There are some facts that are coming out that are swaying things toward the 17-year-old being responsible,” he said Tuesday.

“They had an autopsy yesterday, so we’re still following up on it and we’re going to have to wait until we gather more facts,” Morales said. “Right now we’re just tightening up the case.”

Given the outcome of the investigation so far, detectives will likely send their findings to the Cameron County District Attorney’s Office with a request that additional charges be filed, Morales said.

“It would be a DA case, so we would have to submit our case with our findings to the DA’s office and request to have them look at it and see if there should be upgraded charges,” he said.

Cameron County Jail records show Rodriguez is being held there, with her bail set at $100,000, and that she has been identified as an undocumented immigrant.

____

 

Michael Barajas is a reporter for the Valley Morning Star in Harlingen.

March 19, 2010

Texas Jury Charges and Instructions

JURY CHARGES AND INSTRUCTIONS:
A GENERAL OVERVIEW

Presented By Johnathan Ball

HCBA CRIMINAL LAW CONFERENCE 2010:
Lawyers as Warriors

Presented by
The Hidalgo County Bar Association

Sponsored by
Foster Quan, LLP

Friday, March 5, 2010
Embassy Suites Hotel * 1800 South 2nd Street * McAllen

JURY CHARGES AND INSTRUCTIONS

The volume of case law available to research on jury charges is daunting. Putting together a comprehensive paper on jury charge and jury instruction case law would be a six month undertaking. Even then you’d have to leave out some really good case law. Because this body of case law is so extensive the purpose of this paper is to give you a brief overview of the jury charge and relevant case law. My hope is to give you a good starting point to begin any research you need to do prior to submitting your charge to the jury.

First things first: draft your jury charge before the start of trial. Start by reading the indictment. Figure out what has been pled against your client. Look at the offense as defined in the penal code. Then put together the charge. The charge will act as a road map for you. It will tell you where the prosecution has to go to get their proof. And it will hopefully show you where to find your reasonable doubt.
Also, try to anticipate any midtrial limiting instructions you may need to request. Think about any 404b issues that may get presented to the jury and be prepared to requested a limiting instruction on that issue.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14-19

The starting point for any jury charge is Article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) which states that the court’s charge should “distinctly set … forth the law applicable to the case; not expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury”.

No Piece of Evidence Can be Singled Out

Failure to Videotape a DWI suspect
A jury charge cannot comment on any part of the evidence, regardless of that what evidence was. In Drewett v. State, 704 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Crim.App.,1986) involved a DWI arrest in Harris County. The trial Court instructed the jury as follows:
“You are instructed that under the laws of Texas, a county with a population of 25,000 or more is required to provide electronic devices capable of visually recording a person immediately after his arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Evidence has been introduced in this case that such electronic device was not available in Harris County on January 18, 1984, and that therefore the officer failed to visually record the defendant in this case. This is no evidence that the defendant was intoxicated or was not intoxicated. In your deliberations you shall not consider for any purpose, allude to, comment on or discuss the unavailability of the recording as evidence that the defendant was or was not intoxicated. This evidence has been admitted for the sole purpose of showing, if you so find, the unavailability of a required visual recording at the time of the arrest and the reason therefor.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals held this was an impermissible comment on the evidence because the charge singled out one particular piece of testimony. Be mindful of any instruction that puts a spotlight on anyone witness or piece of evidence.

A recent case from the Court of appeals dealing with comments on evidence is Bartlett v. State 270 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In Bartlett the trial court impermissibly instructed the jury that it could consider the defendant’s failure to take the breath test in its deliberations. This was held to be an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence by the trial Court. The Court of Appeals wrote:

“By singling out that evidence, the trial court violated Articles 36.14, 38.04, and 38.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and committed a jury-charge error…“A judicial instruction that singles out a particular piece of evidence, but does not serve one of the legally authorized purposes set out above, risks impinging upon the ‘independence of the jury in its role as trier of the facts, a role long regarded by Texans as essential to the preservation of their liberties.’ Even a seemingly neutral instruction may constitute an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence because such an instruction singles out that particular piece of evidence for special attention.”

Commenting on Expert Testimony

In Russell v. State, 749 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Crim.App.,1988) the defendant was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The defendant presented a clinical psychologist at trial who testified the Defendant was a pedophiliac and could not conform his conduct with the dictates of society. The court instructed the jury it was not bound by testimony offered by a witness qualified as expert. The court instructed the jury:

“You are instructed that you are not bound by the testimony offered by a witness qualified as an expert. You may give it the weight to which you find it is entitled and may weigh such testimony with all other evidence offered in this case.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals held this was an impermissible singling out of evidence and testimony.
When the Judge Can Single Out Testimony or Evidence in the Charge
Bartlett identified three circumstances when it is appropriate to single out evidence: 1. when the law directs the attachment of a certain amount of weight to evidence, such as accomplice witness testimony, 2. evidence admitted for a limited purpose; when the law has created a statutory presumption; and, 3. when evidence is contingent on the admissibility of certain facts that it is up to the jury to decide. Evidence not in one of these three categories should not be singled out.

Scope of the Charge

Keeping CCP 36.14 in mind, a jury instruction should be crafted by referencing the indictment and the supporting evidence admitted during the trial. Jury instructions should be restricted to the scope of the indictment. Only theories alleged in the pleadings should be given to the jury. See Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). The charge should not enlarge the scope of the pleadings. In other words, the indictment controls the scope of the charge and additional theories should not be included in the charge which were not pled or for which there is no supporting evidence. See Id.
Further, in Dowden v. State 537 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the jury charge included the robbery and aggravated robbery statutes in their entirety. The charge included portions that were neither pled in the indictment, nor proven at trial. The Court held this practice of blindly reciting an entire statute was wrong. In a stinging retribution of the trial court the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote:

“This practice at best is useless and at worst may confuse and mislead the jury and, therefore, prejudice a defendant. This Court in the past has had occasion to caution against the enumeration in the charge of portions of a statute that could not be relied upon for a conviction.”

The Charge Must Apply the Law to This Case

Further, it is not enough to simply recite legal platitudes in the jury charge. The purpose of the charge by a trial court must clearly apply the law to the very facts of the case. It is not simply to recite abstract propositions of law and general principles. See Atunez v. State, 647 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Criminal App.,1983).

Ask and Ye Shall Receive: Charging on A Defensive Theory

There are numerous defensive instructions that can potentially get submitted to the jury. Entrapment, self-defense, mistake, necessity and defense of third persons are a few of the theories available. When in doubt, ask for the instruction. Remember, if evidence is introduced from any source which raises an issue on a defensive theory, the theory must, upon proper request, be included in the court’s charge. Ojeda v. State, 712 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
The accused is entitled to an instruction on the defensive theory even if the issue was raised only by the defendant’s testimony alone. Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). And it does not matter the evidence presented is strong, weak, unimpeached, contradicted, or unbelievable. The defendant is entitled to the instruction. Period. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The reason the defendant is entitled to the instruction once it is raised, is because it is not the court’s function to determine the credibility or weight to be given the evidence raising the defensive issue in a jury trial. Gibson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). It is the province of the jury to determine if the evidence is credible and supports the defensive theory. Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). See also Birch v. State 948 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.-San Antonio,1997).
Request the defensive instruction if the issue is raised from any source, regardless of who strong the testimony or evidence may be.

Fifth Amendment and the Defendant’s Failure to Testify Instruction

We have all heard since we were eight years old about the Fifth Amendment which states “No person shall be []shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
And jury is not permitted to draw adverse inferences from the fact that the Defendant elected not testify at trial on the merits. The defendant shall have the right to have the jury instructed as such. The right to have the jury instructed not to draw adverse inferences from the election to testify carries over to the punishment phase as well. Conversely, if the defendant does elect to at the punishment phase, the jury should be instructed not draw adverse inferences from defendant’s failure to testify at the guilty/innocence stage of trial. See Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Estell v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).

Note: Some jury charges will state something to the effect of : “You are instructed that our law provides that the failure of the defendant to testify shall not be taken as a circumstance against him (emphasis added).” I don’t like when the charges talk about a Defendant’s failure to testify. Failure suggests to me that the Defendant should have done something but did not.
I prefer to see a charge say “Our law provides that a defendant may testify in his own behalf if he elects to do so. This, however, is a privilege accorded a defendant, and in the event he elects not to testify, that fact cannot be taken as a circumstance against him.”

Entitlement to Limiting Instructions During Trian Relating to 404b

Texas Rule of Evidence 105(a) states : When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the Court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly; but, in the absence of the such request the court’s action shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal.” In other words, when evidence or testimony is admitted, the Defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction on the evidence.

In Rankin v. State , 974 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Crim. App-1996) the court held:

“Limiting instructions given for the first time during the jury charge thus do not constitute an efficacious application of Rule 105(a) since it allows for the possibility that evidence will be used improperly in clear contravention to the purpose of the rule. Since limiting instructions operate most effectively when given simultaneously with the relevant evidence, it would not do to grant trial courts “discretion” to deliver those instructions, after they had been properly requested, at a less opportune time.”

The point of Rankin is to ask for the limiting instruction immediately. First, it preserves should the Court refuses the instruction. And secondly, it puts the testimony or evidence into context with the jury immediately. “ The purpose of … midtrial limiting instructions is to insure that the jurors realize the proper use of each bit of evidence as it comes in. Where the jurors have been accumulating their impressions of the evidence over the course of the trial, it is impossible for them to go back at the close of the trial and reassess the evidence in light of the limiting instruction, even if they could appreciate which items of evidence the instruction was supposed to apply to. These difficulties are avoided by instructions at the time of introduction of evidence received for a limited purpose. 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure, Evidence § 5065. See Rankin at 712.

Objecting to the Jury Charge

CCP 36.14 states “[T]he defendant or his counsel shall have a reasonable time to examine the same and he shall present his objections thereto in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of objection…The requirement that the objections to the court’s charge be in writing will be complied with if the objections are dictated to the court reporter in the presence of the court and the state’s counsel, before the reading of the court’s charge to the jury. Compliance with this article is all that is necessary to preserve, for review, the exceptions and objections present to the charge…”
First, remember to take your time in reading the charge. You are allowed sufficient time read the charge and formulate your objections.
Regarding objections, in Almanza v. State, the court of criminal appeals wrote : “we have concluded that Article 36.19 actually separately contains the standards for both fundamental error and ordinary reversible error. If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the error is “calculated to injure the rights of defendant,” which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. In other words, an error which has been properly preserved by objection will call for reversal as long as the error is not harmless. On the other hand, if no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was “fundamental,” he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he “has not had a fair and impartial trial”-in short “egregious harm.”
In other words: When in doubt, object. It is better to be safe and preserve the error for review under a lower threshold.
Conclusion
The jury charge is fertile ground to present your defensive theories. But just as importantly, it is your opportunity to limit the charges against your client to their proper scope. Request any instructions you believe you client is entitled. Object when you think the charge includes or does not include something that is relevant. Especially any type of comment in the charge that singles out on particular witness. And request limiting instructions when necessary to keep evidence in its relevant context.

San Juan Texas Shooting Over Marijuana Smoking

During argument over pot smoking, man shoots neighbor

Comments 7 | Recommend 0

The Monitor

UPDATED

 

SAN JUAN — A man was shot in the back after confronting his neighbors about smoking marijuana near his young children, police said.

The 32-year-old man was transported to McAllen Medical Center, where he is expected to recover from non life-threatening injuries.

The pot problem began on Saturday when the man confronted the three men about smoking marijuana in the open on the 900 block of Shufford Street, apparently visible to the man’s young children, San Juan Police Chief Juan Gonzalez said.

That day, one of the suspects apparently flashed a pistol and threatened his neighbor.

The dispute turned violent Thursday afternoon when he confronted them again.

The three men allegedly began punching the man outside their house at 913 Shufford St., the chief said. The neighbor fell to the ground. The three neighbors passed around a small-caliber pistol until one of them shot the prone man in the back.

Police said the three suspects, 22-year-old Michael Arroyo, 17-year-old Noe Sifuentes and a 16-year-old juvenile, remained on the run and are members of a local street gang. Gonzalez said investigators believe the trio is hiding in the Pharr-San Juan area and are armed and dangerous. The trio fled the area by the time police arrived minutes later.

Canine units from McAllen and Palmview searched the area. Officers are searching several other locations in the area where the suspects — believed to be armed and dangerous — may be hiding, Gonzalez said.

Neighbor Joe Pineda, who said he is friends with the victim, was pruning tree branches in his yard when he heard the gunshot.

“I heard my friend say, ‘You shot me!”’ said Pineda, 76.

The neighborhood along Shufford Street normally is quiet and most neighbors amicably greet each other, Pineda said. The shooting victim would regularly have cookouts in his yard with his family, he said.

Pineda said the only recent problem that bothers him and his neighbors is the public marijuana smoking across the street.

“They smoke pot all night in there,” he said. “We have never had these problems.”

 

 >> Anyone with information about the shooting or the suspects is urged to contact San Juan Crime Stoppers at (956) 283-9477.

 

 ___

Jared Taylor covers law enforcement and general assignments for The Monitor. You can reach him at (956) 683-4439.

December 31, 2009

Teacher arrested, accused of zip tying unruly student

Teacher arrested, accused of zip tying unruly student

Comments 19 | Recommend 0

SAN JUAN — A PSJA middle school teacher was charged Thursday with restraining an 11-year-old student with zip ties.

Jose Manuel Martinez, 25, was arrested at his home about noon that day at his home on the 600 block of Bluebonnet Street in Pharr, according to San Juan Police Chief Juan Gonzalez.

Martinez was later charged with unlawful restraint of a minor at an arraignment hearing at the San Juan Municipal Court. He remains incarcerated at the city jail in lieu of a $20,000 bond.

According to a police affidavit in the case, the boy’s mother told staff at Austin Middle School in San Juan that Martinez had tied the student’s hands with zip ties as he sat in a chair during in-school suspension Dec. 11. The victim’s mother told police Martinez tied the child and prevented him from going to the nurse’s office after he complained of having trouble breathing.

A woman who was present during the incident told police the student had used vulgar language and threatened to run out of class, the statement said. The woman also said the boy became violent and began hitting his hands against walls, refusing to do his assigned class work. She told police the child was tied for about five minutes — this was the third time the boy had been restrained in this manner.

A spokesperson with the Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent school district did not return messages left Thursday afternoon.

Unlawful restraint of a child is a state jail felony. If Martinez is convicted, he could be incarcerated for up to two years and forced to pay a $10,000 fine.

Ana Ley covers law enforcement and general assignments for The Monitor. She can be reached at (956) 683-4428.

Hidalgo County District clerk arrested for alleged drunken driving

District clerk arrested for alleged drunken driving

Comments 245 | Recommend 46

The Monitor

EDINBURG – Hidalgo County District Clerk Laura Hinojosa disputed allegations Sunday that she was driving while intoxicated when pulled over by a state trooper earlier that morning.

Authorities arrested the 43-year-old elected official after she failed multiple field sobriety checks during a traffic stop just after 1 a.m. near the intersection of North “I” and El Dora roads in San Juan, said Texas Department of Public Safety Spokesman Johnny Hernandez.

As of late Sunday afternoon, Hinojosa had been booked and released from the Hidalgo County jail, where she refused to take a Breathalyzer test.

“I honestly did not think I was not fit to drive or else I wouldn’t have,” she said, adding that she plans to fight the charge in court.

Hinojosa, the daughter of U.S. Rep Rubén Hinojosa, D-Mercedes, was first elected in 2006 to the position that oversees filings for all of the county’s state district courts.

She replaced former District Clerk Omar Guerrero, who faced a DWI arrest of his own in 2005. Those charges were later dropped after an Hidalgo County jury cleared him of unrelated charges stemming from a consensual sexual relationship he was accused of having with a minor.

Hinojosa launched her campaign for a second term in office earlier this month.

Driving while intoxicated is a Class B misdemeanor for a first-time offender. If convicted, she could face up to six months in the county jail and $2,000 in fines.

“It’s really just an awful situation,” Hinojosa said. “I humbly ask for the respect of my family’s privacy. I appreciate everybody’s support.”

————

Jeremy Roebuck covers courts and general assignments for The Monitor. He can be reached at (956) 683-4437.

Jennifer L. Berghom covers education and general assignments for The Monitor. She can be reached at (956) 683-4462.

 

Correction: An earlier version of this story contained an error. Hidalgo County District Clerk Laura Hinojosa oversees the county’s state district courts. The county clerk oversees the county’s courts-at-law. The online version of the story has been changed to reflect the correct information.

The Monitor strives to accurately report the news in Hidalgo County and the Rio Grande Valley. Please report any errors of fact to the reporter whose byline appears on the story.

October 17, 2009

BAIL IN TEXAS

THE RIGHT TO BAIL

     The Excessive Bail provision of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is based on an old English common law right of Englishmen and the British Bill of Rights. It is considered a fundamental right by the Supreme Court of the United States.

     The United States Supreme Court has stated that “Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary government action.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). The Court has also held that “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (reserved on other grounds). Additionally, the Eighth Amendment states that “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. However, the courts have interpreted this constitutional provision to prohibit excessive bail without a right to bail. Bail becomes excessive when courts set a higher than reasonably necessary amount to ensure that a defendant appears at trial

THE RIGHT TO BAIL IN TEXAS

     The Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” This fundamental right allows an accused to be free before conviction, allowing the defendant to preparae a defense and preventing unjust punishment of the wrongfully accused. It would seem that prohibiting excessive bail would mean that bail should be made available and affordable to everyone. That is not always the case.
     Article 1, Section 11, of the Texas Constitution extends the right to bail to all defendants except those charged with capital offenses. This constitutional provision is buttressed by Article 1, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution which prohibits excessive bail. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law.”

TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION IN SETTING BAIL

      Texas jurisprudence is well-settled that the trial court enjoys inherent discretion in setting bail. The primary purpose of a bond is securing the defendant’s presence at trial. Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Ex parte Bonilla, 742 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.). The factors a trial court should consider in setting bail are set out in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 17.15 (Vernon Supp. 2004):

      1.         The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

      2.         The power to require bail is not to be used as an instrument of oppression.

      3.         The nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission are to be considered.

      4.         The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken on this point.

       5.         The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered.

      Texas has an extensive body of case law dealing with bail issues which interpret the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. See Ludwig v. State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)(stating that to be governed in the exercise of [its] discretion by the Constitution and by the [article 17.15 factors]“). The general principles of bail law are well established in appellate court decisions. Once bail has been set, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the bail is excessive. See: Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Ex parte Martinez-Velasco, 666 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.). The Court is to set bail sufficiently high to provide reasonable assurance the accused will submit himself to the Court proceeding, but bail should not be so high as to constitute an instrument of oppression. See: Ex parte Bufkin, 553 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977; Ex parte Willman, 695 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.)

       In considering the amount of bail to set, Courts be guided by such criteria as:

        1.          The defendant’s work record;

        2.         Family ties to the community;

        3.         Residency in the community; and 

        4.         Past criminal record. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Martinez-Velasco, 666 S.W.2d at 14-15.

     While have a past criminal record will not necessarily prevent the defendant from getting bail. As long as the Defendant appeared in Court at the right times and no prior judgment nisi’s or capias warrants were issued, prior criminal record will have much less of an impact. The opposite is true though. If the defendant has a criminal record and a history of not appearing in Court, this will likely be held against him and his bail set higher.

TEXAS CASES DEALING WITH BAIL PRINCIPLES

            In Ex parte Dueitt, 529 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975) the defendant was indicted in Harris County on two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. Prior to his indictment and shortly after his arrest, a local justice of the peace reduced defendants bail from $20,000 to $10,000. Defendant posted bail and was released from custody. Following his indictment, the trial court reset bail at $60,000 and the defendant was re-arrested. He could not post the $60,000. He filed a pretrial habeas corpus petition alleging the bail was excessive. Id., at 532. It was established at the habeas hearing that defendant was 23 years of age, married, and father of a three year old daughter; and that he had lived his entire life in Harris County. He had never been convicted of a felony and his former employer said he could have his job back if released on bail. Id. The court of appeals ordered that the $60,000 bond reduced to the original $10,000.

        In Ex parte Branch, 653 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) the defendant was charged with possession of heroin. Bond was set at $500,000. The State offered evidence at the pretrial habeas hearing that the defendant had three other charges pending against him, including an aggravated assault on a peace officer; and that he had already posted bonds in the amount of $200,000 in those cases. The defendant, through his wife, established he was unable to raise the $50,000 fee necessary to make the $500,000 bond. Defendants wife testified that her husband had worked at Gulf Oil Corporation for twenty-three years, and that he had been working with his father at a store prior to his arrest. The appeals court found the $500,000 bond excessive and ordered it reduced to $20,000.

                        In Ludwig v. State the defendant had been charged with two murders. Bond was set at $2,000,000. The defendant requested a bail reduction and presented evidence of a limited ability to make bond because his assets were frozen by court order. The defendants family members testified there were able to collectively offer $10,000.  The defendant was a vetrinarian in Katy and had strong communiy ties. There was no indication the defendant had a criminal record or had failed to attended any hearings in the past. The appeals court ordered it reduced to $50,000.

            In Ex parte Khalid Sabur-Smith, 73 S.W.3d 436 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002)(per curiam) involved a twenty two year old defendant. He was arrested and charged with second degree felony assault charge. Defendant lived with his mother was living with his mother and had strong family ties to the community which included a large extended family. For three years prior to his arrest defendant was employed at various jobs. Defendant’s prior criminal conduct involved only two prior trespass warnings. The State conceded Defendant had never been arrested. The sexual assault victim in this case claimed the Defendant had offered drugs in exchanged for sex. When the victim refused the Defendant alleged forced himself on her. Several months later following a DNA match Defendant was arrested. His bond was set at $150,000. Defense counsel requested the bond be substantially lowered. But this request was denied by the Court.

            The appellate court held that while no precise standard for reviewing bond settings on appeal, the right to a reasonable bond is based on the presumption of innocence …” The primary factorsto be considered by the court are punishment and the nature of the offense. The court said the crime Defendant was accused of was a second degree felony for which Defendant could be imprisoned for up to twenty years with a fine up to $10,000. The appellate court stated that excessive bonds are justified only when violence was during the crime and/or the defendant has a lengthy criminal history of sexual assaults and violence. Substantiating this point the court cited to Balawajder v. State, 759 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.) where the defendant was charged with aggravated rape and robbery. Further the defendant had at least one prior felony conviction and arrest in three states. The other case cited by the Sabur-Smith Court was Ex parte Ruiz, 692 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.App.-Austin 1985, no pet.) wherein the defendant was charged with six felonies. Further, the Defendant was a career criminal with a violent past. The bond in the Balawajder case was $50,000 and in the Ruiz case it was $100,000. These bonds were significantly lower than in the Sabur-Smiths case. After nothing that Sabur-Smith did not pose any future threat to either the victim or the general public, the court found his $150,000 bond excessive and ordered it reduced to $30,000.

            In Ex parte Martinez-Velasco, the defendant was indicted for delivering cocaine. His bond was set at an astounding $2,000,000.  Defendant filed pretrial motions asking his bond be reduced.  At the reduction hearing the defendant showed he was an Ecuadorian citizen who had resided and worked in the U.S. for 3o years.  He had community ties in the form of long lasting friendships and no prior criminal record.  Additionally, his arrest had been completely uneventful. The appeals court ultimately reduced the bond to $375,000.

            In Ex parte Veselka, 2008 WL 4958305 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2008, no pet. h.)(not designated for publication) the Court of Appeals upheld a $750,000.00 bond in a capital murder case, finding that, considering the facts of the case, the circumstances of appellant’s arrest, appellant’s ability to make bail, and his ties to the community, “we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in only reducing the bail to $750,000.”

       

September 26, 2009

Alton armed robbery suspects arrested after standoff

The Monitor

ALTON — Officers’ final suspect in an armed robbery fell into their lap Thursday evening.

Alton police responded about 5:15 p.m. Thursday to a report that four men had robbed a Pocket cell phone store near the intersection of Five Mile Line and Bryan roads.

The store clerk told police one of the four criminals covered his face with a blue T-shirt, demanded mobile phones and cash, and displayed a gun during the robbery, said Enrique Sotelo, Alton’s interim police chief.

An Hidalgo County sheriff’s deputy spotted the black Chrysler 300 that the suspects took off in after the incident.

Officers arrested the vehicle’s two teenage occupants, who eventually told police the other duo was hiding out in the attic of a house on Kantulil Street, near the intersection of 5 1/2 Mile Line and Bryan Road, police said.

Police tried to coax the pair from the tiny attic but were unable to reach them at right away, Sotelo said. The suspects were hiding in a space only about 2 feet tall.

“We tried negotiations for a couple of hours,” Sotelo said. “We couldn’t get anybody out.”

Officers called in a canine unit from Palmview to try to scare the suspects from the attic, but the dog could barely fit inside and almost broke through the ceiling.

Finally, Sotelo crawled into the attic himself, he said, and pulled out one of the teens hiding beneath the fiberglass insulation.

Minutes later, the other crashed through the ceiling and onto the floor, where officers were waiting for him.

The four teens — ages 16-18 — will face aggravated robbery charges in connection with Thursday evening’s events, which wrapped up about 9:15 p.m., police said.

Officers recovered about 20 mobile phones and some cash believed to have been stolen from the store, Sotelo said. No injuries were reported in connection with the robbery or standoff.

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Jared Taylor covers law enforcement and general assignments for The Monitor. You can reach him at (956) 683-4439.

Gang member faces possible death sentence for college grad’s murder

The Monitor

EDINBURG — Nearly four years after his daughter’s murder, Sergio Cavazos finally allowed himself to breathe easy knowing her killer would not go free.

He choked back tears minutes after an Hidalgo County jury convicted 26-year-old gang member Mario Quintanilla in the woman’s 2005 slaying.

“I believe in God. I believe in justice,” Cavazos said. “And I believe that Larissa is looking down on us right now.”

Jurors took more than seven hours Thursday to find Quintanilla guilty of capital murder, setting off a second phase of the trial in which they will decide today whether or not to sentence him to death.

Their decision comes after an eight-day trial in which two of Quintanilla’s fellow members of the Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos gang described a detailed jailhouse confession of how he killed 23-year-old Larissa Cavazos.

Prosecutors allege Quintanilla and several other men broke into the woman’s Edinburg apartment during the early morning hours of Dec. 21, 2005, believing it to be a cocaine stash house. When they were unable to find any drugs, they beat her, shot her and left her to die.

An aspiring speech pathologist, the woman had graduated from the University of Texas-Pan American only days before her death and had a job interview in Brownsville scheduled for that morning.

While she had no known association to drugs, investigators believe another gang member had taken Quintanilla to her apartment days before the botched home invasion to purchase cocaine from a drug dealer attending a party there.

It took Edinburg police more than a year to link the slaying back to Quintanilla and his accomplices, but not before they investigated Larissa Cavazos’ boyfriend for the death.

Eventually, officers traced a cell phone taken from her apartment to a home Quintanilla and his accomplices frequented in McAllen. And once they started looking into his background, they uncovered a network of potential gang witnesses.

Two gang members told jurors this week that after Quintanilla had been charged with the murder, he described the woman’s death in vivid detail while confined in the Hidalgo County Jail. Their testimony corroborated much of the evidence police found at the crime scene, said Cregg Thompson, an Hidalgo County Assistant District Attorney.

“In order to catch bigger criminals, sometimes you have to go through little criminals,” he said.

But Quintanilla’s defense team questioned the trustworthiness of those gang members. Both men were serving sentences of their own for unrelated crimes and stood to gain by helping police solve the murder case, attorney Sergio Valdez said.

“From the moment (the state) got up there and made their opening statements, they were selling fear,” he said. “The evidence they presented doesn’t support these lying convicts.”

Prosecutors had hoped that testimony from Quintanilla’s accomplice — 33-year-old Alfredo “Fro” Gutierrez Valdez — would clinch a guilty verdict. In February, Valdez abruptly ended his trial for Cavazos’ murder by agreeing to plead guilty and accept a life sentence in exchange for a promise he would testify against his fellow gang member.

But when he was called to the stand last week, he refused to answer questions about his or Quintanilla’s involvement. It remains unclear what action the state could take against him for breaking his plea agreement.

Quintanilla now faces either a life sentence or the death penalty — the only two options available for a capital murder conviction. Jurors are expected to reconvene this morning to hear testimony in the punishment phase of his trial.

But as Sergio Cavazos left the courtroom late Thursday night, the bereaved father looked forward to the chance to finally address his daughter’s killer.

“That man has to pay for what he did to our family,” he said. “And he will pay.”

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Jeremy Roebuck covers courts and general assignments for The Monitor. You can reach him at (956) 683-4437.

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